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The Americans with Disabilities Act 




A major goal of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) is to more fully integrate working-aged people with disabilities
into the labor force and to increase their employment rate to be more in
line with the rest of the population. At the time of its passage, ADA
proponents believed that the ADA’s antidiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation mandates would accomplish this goal and increase
both the employment and economic well-being of working-aged peo-
ple with disabilities. Few would disagree with this ADA goal. In fact,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, despite great controversy at the time of its
passage, has been shown to contribute to the achievement of this goal
for blacks. In contrast, ADA critics today argue that instead of increas-
ing their employment, the costs associated with these mandates had the
unintended consequence of reducing the employment opportunities of
those with disabilities. 
 This chapter summarizes the empirical evidence on the labor mar-
ket consequences of the ADA. It will show that, to date, the ADA—as
well as similar state-level legislation that preceded the ADA—has
reduced the employment opportunities of those with disabilities. This
evidence is consistent with the argument that accommodation and
employment-protection costs can reduce the employment of the indi-
viduals these actions are meant to protect. This policy failure, rather
than a disagreement on goals, is the basis for the case against the ADA
as a vehicle for improving the labor market outcomes for working-aged
people with disabilities. The ADA has not only failed to increase
employment opportunities for people with disabilities but has actually
reduced them. Hence, those interested in more fully integrating work-
ing-aged people with disabilities into the workforce and reducing their
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dependence on government disability-related transfers should recon-
sider their support of the ADA as the vehicle for achieving that goal
and instead focus on alternative policies. 
BACKGROUND
Many working-aged Americans are limited in their ability to func-
tion as a result of a health-related impairment—in 1993, 16 percent of
men aged 18–62 reported a functional limitation, and 11 percent
reported a work limitation owing to a health impairment (DeLeire
2001). Moreover, many American workers are at risk of disability as a
result of a workplace injury. Reville and Schoeni (2002) find that 34
percent of working-aged adults with disabilities in the Health and
Retirement Study say their disability was the result of a work-related
injury or from the nature of their work. Social policy in the United
States has increasingly focused on integrating working-aged people
with disabilities into the labor force and reducing their reliance on dis-
ability transfer programs. The most important effort in this regard has
been the passage of the ADA. This act, fashioned in large part on the
civil rights protection granted to other protected minorities by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, was an attempt through mandates to achieve this
goal for working-aged people with disabilities.
The ADA was passed on July 26, 1990, and became effective two
years later. Although numerous states had laws providing employment
protections for workers with disabilities prior to 1990 (Beegle and
Stock 2002), the ADA represents the first federal law providing
employment protections for workers with disabilities in the private sec-
tor (although the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied to federal contrac-
tors). There are two components of Title I of the ADA. First, the ADA
bans discrimination in wages, hiring, firing, and promotion. Second,
employers are required to provide “reasonable” accommodation for
their disabled workers. Examples of reasonable accommodation
include providing access to work areas, job restructuring, and special
equipment or assistive devices. 
These two provisions, while protecting individuals’ rights, also
impose costs on employers. Further, the cost of accommodation is one
The ADA and the Employment of People with Disabilities 261
that is unlike costs that were associated with the civil rights protection
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Enforced through the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the courts, the
ADA imposes litigation costs on firms. For example, firms that have
settled with the EEOC have paid an average settlement of $13,137
(U.S. EEOC 2001). Even without a judgment, however, the cost of
defending a discrimination suit has been estimated to be as much as
$100,000 (Olson 1997). 
The evidence on the magnitude of the cost of accommodation to
firms is thin. What evidence exists suggests that these costs are small
on average (Berkeley Planning Associates 1982; Job Accommodation
Network 1999). However, as I have argued elsewhere (DeLeire
2000b), these data seriously underestimate the potential costs of
accommodations by including accommodations that would have been
granted even in the absence of the law and by counting certain accom-
modations as zero cost because they do not involve the purchase of
equipment. For example, the studies count job restructuring as zero
cost despite large costs this accommodation can impose on firms.
Despite shortcomings, these studies have found that a potentially
important fraction of accommodations are quite expensive. For exam-
ple, while the Berkeley Planning Associates study found that the aver-
age cost of accommodation was small, the study also found that 8
percent of accommodations cost more than $2,000, 4 percent cost more
than $5,000, and 2 percent cost more than $20,000 (which in 2001 dol-
lars would be more than $3,700, $9,300, and $37,000, respectively).
Moreover, this survey reports only the costs of accommodations made,
not the costs of accommodations that were requested and denied. It is
reasonable to suspect that the costs of denied accommodations would
exceed the costs of those that were granted. Therefore, the average
costs of new accommodation requests under the ADA are likely to be
much larger than the average costs reported in these surveys. 
Defining Disability
The most common image of those targeted for ADA protection is
of working-aged people with mobility, vision, or hearing impairments.
The ADA, however, covers a much broader set of health impairments.
The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
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substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of . . . [an]
individual, a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment” (ADA 1990). Major life activities include walk-
ing, lifting, seeing, hearing, breathing, and working. In fact, the set of
individuals with mobility, vision, and hearing impairments represent
only 17 percent of the population of people with disabilities, according
to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The other
83 percent of people with disabilities in the SIPP have back impair-
ments, impairments arising from stroke, heart problems, asthma, diabe-
tes, cancer, high blood pressure, kidney or stomach problems, are HIV
positive or have AIDS, have a mental disability, or have a substance
abuse problem (based on author’s calculations from the SIPP). 
Although the ADA potentially covers a much broader set of
impairments than is commonly understood, still uncertain is which
members of the population with impairments are considered to be part
of the class protected by the ADA. The EEOC and the courts have dis-
agreed over how broadly disability is defined under the ADA. For
example, in Toyota v. Williams, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled
that an individual with carpal tunnel syndrome who could still do tasks
central to most people’s daily lives was not disabled under the ADA.
The EEOC had previously taken the position that they were. If the
EEOC and the courts have been uncertain over who is protected by the
ADA, surely employers have been even more uncertain. For such
employers, this uncertainty is likely to have further increased their
risks and costs associated with hiring people with disabilities.
Moreover, eligibility to sue under the ADA is determined by the
courts on an individual basis. Many individuals who have filed claims
against employers through the EEOC or the courts have been found not
to be protected by the ADA. The claims and lawsuits filed by these
individuals are not costless to employers. Even a successful defense of
a claim can cost a firm tens of thousands of dollars. In addition,
because there is a lottery aspect to any court proceeding, where judge
or jury determines the facts of the case, some individuals will be suc-
cessful in their claims when identical individuals will be unsuccessful.
Therefore, even if an employer believes an individual with disabilities
is not protected by the ADA (either because he or she is unable to be
reasonably accommodated, would be unable to perform the essential
functions of the job even with accommodations, or is not in fact limited
The ADA and the Employment of People with Disabilities 263
in a major life function), the employer still may believe that there is a
risk of being sued by this individual. Moreover, individuals who end
up not being covered may face reduced employment opportunities—
because of employers’ fear of lawsuits—yet ultimately not receive
remedies when they do sue because they are not, in fact, protected by
the ADA.
Kruse and Schur (Chapter 8) and Blanck, Schwochau, and Song
(Chapter 9) argue that policymakers should only be concerned with the
well-being of people with disabilities who are within the ADA pro-
tected class. However, uncertainties surrounding who is protected by
the law (and who will sue, even if ultimately unsuccessful) suggest that
the ADA could have an effect on individuals with disabilities who are
not covered by the law. The ADA could likewise assist individuals
who are not covered by the act. For example, accommodations, such as
modifications to work environments, made by employers for protected
workers may also benefit workers with disabilities who are not covered
by the ADA, and may improve their employment outcomes. In either
case, a narrow, legalistic view of the impacts of the ADA misses the
larger population of people with disabilities of interest to policymak-
ers.
THE A PRIORI CASE AGAINST THE ADA
Prior to passage of the ADA, several authors argued that the ADA
would not lead to a better integration of working-aged people with dis-
abilities into the labor force or improvement in their economic well-
being. I review these arguments in this section.
In their critical analyses of the ADA, both Weaver (1991) and
Rosen (1991) point out that the ADA differs from federal civil rights
protections for minorities and women in that it not only bans discrimi-
nation but also requires firms to provide “reasonable” accommodations
to its employees with disabilities. Further, they argue that the costs of
accommodation would represent a barrier to increasing employment
opportunities and would reduce the demand for disabled workers and
thus the number of disabled people employed (Rosen 1991 p. 23;
Weaver 1991, p. 11). Weaver also predicted that the ADA would lead
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to distributional effects as well; firms would have relatively greater
incentive to employ workers with disabilities who require little accom-
modation.
Epstein (1992) argues, as part of a more general argument against
all antidiscrimination legislation when applied to labor markets, that
the ADA is not the best way to assist people with disabilities in the
labor market. He contends that protected groups are better served by
freedom of contract (employment at will) and competitive labor mar-
kets in which entry is unfettered. Employers would have no reason to
avoid hiring impaired workers out of (the mistaken) fear that they are
less capable given that they would be free to fire any worker, impaired
or not, who does not work productively. Workers with impairments
would have greater levels of employment—although with fewer guar-
antees of continued employment—while employers would gain greater
experience at employing workers with impairments. 
Burkhauser (1990) argues that the ADA would be less effective at
inducing employers to provide accommodations for people with dis-
abilities than would a tax credit (or other type of subsidy) to employers
for such accommodations. However, he also argues that the mandated-
accommodation approach of the ADA was favored politically because
it was off budget; that is, it did not involve any budget outlay or tax
offsets by the federal government.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) present a model in which the ADA
could reduce employment of people with disabilities by increasing
employer costs (including costs of accommodation and potential costs
of litigation). However, they also show that the ADA possibly could
increase employment of people with disabilities through its implicit
hiring subsidy. This implicit hiring subsidy is caused by employers’
fear that an applicant with a disability who is not hired may sue. Thus,
it is may be less expensive to hire an applicant with a disability.
Therefore, on theoretical grounds, the ADA could have led to an
increase or to a decrease in the employment of people with disabilities
depending on the relative importance of accommodation costs, firing
costs, and hiring costs. To measure the impact of the ADA, I turn next
to a review of the empirical studies of the ADA’s effects.
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EMPIRICAL STUDIES—THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
AGAINST THE ADA
To date, two major studies have used national data sets to examine
the employment effects of the ADA: DeLeire (2000b) and Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001). The methods used in these studies are similar to
those in studies that examined the impact of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; that is, they examine trends in employment rates of people with
disabilities relative to people without disabilities around the time the
ADA was passed. The literature measuring the impact of the 1964
Civil Rights Act on the economic status of blacks includes studies by
Freeman (1973) and Brown (1984), both of which found an upward
shift in relative black economic status following 1964. (For a complete
discussion of this literature and of the effect of civil rights policy on
black economic progress, see Donohue and Heckman [1991]). These
studies all examine black-white earnings ratios over a period of time
spanning the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Findings that relative
earnings increased post–1964 are taken as evidence that the act had
positive effects. It is important to note that the preponderance of the
evidence from studies using this method is that the Civil Rights Act did
reduce employment discrimination and increase the employment of
blacks.
The empirical studies of the impact of the ADA, described below,
have a similar design as those used to evaluate the Civil Rights Act.
For the most part, they examine relative employment rates before and
after the enactment or implementation of the ADA to infer its impact.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2000b) also employ addi-
tional comparisons that help shed light on whether any changes in
employment trends are the result of the ADA. Because the ADA was
enacted (and implemented) for all people with disabilities simulta-
neously,1 it is difficult to disentangle alternative explanations why dis-
abled employment has fallen. In response to this problem, Beegle and
Stock (2002) examine the employment impact of state disability laws
that were implemented between 1970 and 1990. In this section, I
review each of these studies.
266 DeLeire
Data Sources and the Definition of Disability
DeLeire (2000b) uses data from the 1986 through 1993 panels of
the SIPP on a sample of men aged 18 to 64. These data contain infor-
mation on whether each individual worked in the previous four-month
period as well as a large number of demographic characteristics of the
individuals. Disability is measured by a self-report of a “health impair-
ment that limits the type or amount of work an individual can do.” Ace-
moglu and Angrist (2001) use data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Beegle and Stock (2002) use data from the 1970, 1980, and
1990 Decennial Censuses. As in the SIPP, the measure of disability
available in the CPS and in the Census is a self-reported work limita-
tion.2 As discussed by Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg
(Chapter 2), although this is not an ideal measure for establishing the
working-aged population with disabilities, employment trends in this
population are not significantly different from those using other mea-
sures of disabilities. 
The Employment Effect of the ADA: Evidence from 1990–1992
Both DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist examine employment
trends around the time the ADA was passed and implemented to
empirically assess the effect of the ADA. Both studies estimate empiri-
cal models of employment and interpret declines as evidence that the
ADA had a negative impact on the demand for disabled employment.
Acemoglu and Angrist, using the CPS, estimate linear regressions of
weeks worked and control for a large set of demographic characteris-
tics—age, race, education, and region all interacted with year dum-
mies. DeLeire, using the SIPP, estimates probit models of employment
and controls for age, education, marital status, race, industry, and occu-
pation. Importantly, both studies use individuals without disabilities
who have similar skill levels as a comparison group by which to mea-
sure the post-ADA experiences of those with disabilities. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the estimated effect of the ADA on relative
employment rates of working-aged (18–64) people with disabilities.
The top panel of Figure 7.1 plots the employment rate of men with and
without disabilities from 1986 through 1995 using data from the SIPP.
The bottom panel of Figure 7.1 plots the employment rate of men with
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disabilities relative to that of men without disabilities. Neither panel
controls for demographic characteristics. Although the employment of
men without disabilities was slightly lower in the years following
1990, the employment of men with disabilities fell dramatically begin-
ning in 1990, the year the ADA was passed. Empirical models of
employment yield similar results and are reported in Table 7.1. I inter-
pret Figure 7.1 as prima facie evidence that the ADA did not work as
intended; rather than making it easier for people with disabilities to
find employment, the ADA has made it more difficult.
Acemoglu and Angrist find similar results using the CPS when
they examine weeks worked. There are, however, two differences
between the findings from the CPS and those from the SIPP. First,
Acemoglu and Angrist observe declines in weeks worked beginning
only in 1992, the year the ADA became effective. Second, they
observe steep declines primarily for men and women aged 21–39, and
only slight declines for men aged 40–58, and they do not observe
Figure 7.1 Employment Rates of Men With and Without Work 
Limitations Disabilities, Aged 18–64: SIPP Data
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Table 7.1 Summary of Empirical Studies of the Effects of Disability 
Discrimination Laws 
NOTE: The data in this table can be interpreted as follows: Columns (1) and (6) show
the difference in employment rates between people with and without disabilities in
the first row, the change in employment rates for people without disabilities after the
law was enacted in the second row, and the change in employment rates for people
with disabilities (over and above the change for people without disabilities) in the
third row. The first row of column (2) again shows the difference in employment rates
between people with and without disabilities. Each row from the fourth onward
shows the difference in the employment rate of people with disabilities relative to the
employment rate of people without disabilities between the given year and 1989. For
example, in the eleventh row, the –0.07 indicates that the employment rate of people
with disabilities fell by 7 percentage point more than that for people without disabili-
ties between 1989 and 1993. Columns (3), (4), and (5) show the difference in weeks
worked between people with and without disabilities. For example, in the eleventh
row, third column, the –1.44 indicates that the number of weeks worked by people
with disabilities fell by 1.44 weeks since 1987 relative to the change in the number of
weeks worked by people without disabilities. 
SOURCE: Results from DeLeire (2000b, Table 4) are based on SIPP data for men aged
18–64. Results from Acemoglu and Angrist (2001, Table 2) are based on CPS data
for men aged 21–39, women aged 21–39, and men aged 40–58, respectively. Results
from Beegle and Stock (2002), Table 5, are based on census data for men and women
aged 18–64. All studies measure disability as the presence of a work limitation and









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disabled –0.26 –0.24 – – – –0.28
Post-law –0.02 – – – – 0.01
Post-law x disabled –0.04 – – – – –0.12
1986 x disabled – –0.02 – – – –
1987 x disabled – –0.03 – – – –
1988 x disabled – –0.02 –0.41 –1.08 –0.49 –
1989 x disabled – – 2.00 0.67 –0.47 –
1990 x disabled – –0.03 –0.79 –1.33 –0.22 –
1991 x disabled – –0.06 –0.53 0.08 0.34 –
1992 x disabled – –0.06 0.57 –2.81 0.77 –
1993 x disabled – –0.07 –1.44 –4.37 –2.12 –
1994 x disabled – –0.07 –1.63 –5.00 –1.57 –
1995 x disabled – –0.07 –2.93 –3.93 –1.83 –
1996 x disabled – – –2.68 –4.41 –0.75 –
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declines for women aged 40–58. Their results change little when they
add controls or employ alternative estimation methods.
Table 7.1 summarizes the results from DeLeire, Acemoglu and
Angrist, and Beegle and Stock. All three studies conduct additional
analyses comparing the relative employment declines across groups
and across states. These analyses provide further evidence that the
ADA—as opposed to some other policy change—is responsible for the
employment decline for people with disabilities.
 First, Acemoglu and Angrist control for the fact that Social Secu-
rity Disability Income (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
recipiency rates increased over this period as well. They do so in three
ways: they first examine employment trends only for nonrecipients;
second, they control for the individual’s SSDI and SSI receipt; and
third, in each year, they control for the statewide fraction of individuals
receiving SSDI and SSI. In no case do any of their results change sub-
stantially. That is, the declines in employment in the CPS following the
implementation of the ADA are over and above those that could con-
ceivably be the result of changes in SSDI or SSI policies. Acemoglu
and Angrist also examine employment patterns by firm size. They
found larger employment declines in medium-sized firms (those with
25 to 99 employees) than in smaller firms or larger firms. These find-
ings are consistent with the ADA being the source of the employment
declines because firms with fewer than 15 employees are exempt from
the ADA, and very large firms are likely best able to absorb the costs of
the ADA. They find no evidence, however, that the separation rate of
people with disabilities fell, a fact they interpret as suggesting that the
accommodation costs of the ADA might be a more important explana-
tion for the decline in employment than the threat of lawsuits for
wrongful termination. Finally, they find that employment, particularly
of younger disabled men, fell more in states with a greater number of
ADA-related EEOC charges than in other states.
State Disability Discrimination Laws
Beegle and Stock (2002) use data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990
Censuses along with data on state-level disability discrimination stat-
utes to determine the employment effects of these state laws—all of
which preceded the ADA. Because, unlike the ADA, these state-level
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antidiscrimination statutes were enacted in different states in different
decades, it is easier to disentangle their effects on employment of peo-
ple with disabilities from the effects of nationwide trends or changes in
other policies. Some of these state laws were quite similar to the ADA,
while others either had no accommodation requirement or did not
cover mental impairments. In all cases, the resources dedicated to
enforcement of these state laws likely were not as great as those of the
EEOC to enforce the ADA. 
How does the analysis of Beegle and Stock differ from those in
DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist? The two latter studies, in their
simplest form, compare employment rates of people with disabilities to
those without disabilities before and after the act was passed. A poten-
tial concern is that something else, in addition to the ADA, happened
around 1990–1992 that would affect employment rates of people with
disabilities relative to employment rates of people without disabilities.
Beegle and Stock use the variation in the timing of disability discrimi-
nation laws being passed in different states at different times. For
example, Connecticut had a disability discrimination law in place by
1980 (enacted during the 1970s) while Rhode Island did not have a dis-
ability discrimination law in place until 1990 (enacted during the
1980s). Therefore, the authors can compare changes in employment
rates of people with disabilities between 1970 and 1980 in Connecticut
not only with changes in employment rates of people without disabili-
ties between 1970 and 1980 in Connecticut, but also with changes in
employment of people with disabilities between 1970 and 1980 in
Rhode Island.
Beegle and Stock’s findings are summarized in column (6) of
Table 7.1. They find, as did the earlier research, that disability discrim-
ination laws are associated with lower levels of employment of people
with disabilities. Although the estimated effects of the state disability
discrimination laws appear to be larger than the estimated effects of the
ADA, the effects may not be comparable for several reasons. First,
because Beegle and Stock use Census data, they measure the effects of
the state laws over a longer period of time than do the studies examin-
ing the ADA. Second, the ADA was enacted on top of existing state
disability discrimination law. Thus, the marginal effect of the ADA on
employment rates might be smaller than would have occurred in the
absence of these pre-existing laws.3
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Are the Measured Employment Declines Real?
In a recent paper (summarized in Chapter 8), Kruse and Schur
(2001) conduct an investigation of the trends in employment of people
with disabilities in the early 1990s using data from the SIPP. The
authors argue that disability can be measured in many different ways,
both conceptually and using available data. The authors create 14 dif-
ferent measures of disability and show that, in contrast to the measures
commonly used that show a decline in the employment of working-
aged people with disabilities, some of these alternative measures show
either no decline or an increase in employment. Because measures of
functional limitations were available in the SIPP only beginning in the
1990 panel, Kruse and Schur estimate how employment (measured as
the percentage of weeks worked) has changed since 1990. Because the
ADA was passed on July 26, 1990, their data contain only a very short
“pre-ADA” period with which to compare “post-ADA” employment.
The authors conclude that studies that suggest that employment
declined—in particular studies that suggest that employment declined
as a result of the ADA—may be mistaken. 
Although Kruse and Schur observe substantial declines in employ-
ment when the entire population of people with disabilities is used
(based on either of the two broadest measures of disability—a work
limitation or any functional “activity of daily living” (ADL) limita-
tion), their preferred samples are based on specific subpopulations of
people with disabilities. First, they exclude people with disabilities
who report that they cannot work at all. Second, they use the popula-
tion that reports a functional or ADL limitation, but not a work disabil-
ity. These populations—in most of their specifications—represent less
than one-half of the entire population of people with disabilities, based
on a self-reported work limitation or any functional or ADL limitation.
The authors find that when people who are unable to work at all as
a result of their disability are excluded from the sample of people with
disabilities, there is no decline in employment. Moreover, when people
who report a work limitation in addition to a functional or ADL limita-
tion are excluded from the sample of people with disabilities (i.e., only
those with a functional or ADL limitation but no work limitation are
included), there is an increase in employment following the ADA.
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One should not exclude individuals who say they cannot work as a
result of their disability, however. Disability is not a medical condition,
but rather the interaction of a medical condition with a person’s envi-
ronment. A person could report that “their health condition prevents
them from working” because they did not receive reasonable accom-
modations or because they face discrimination. Therefore, unlike
Kruse and Schur, I think it is incorrect to characterize individuals in
this group as not being covered by the ADA because they are “not
qualified” to work and, therefore, exclude them from analysis. In addi-
tion, excluding individuals with disabilities who do not work and who
report that they are unable to work is essentially excluding the nonem-
ployed—a major limitation in measuring the effect of the ADA on
employment. Burkhauser and co-authors (Chapter 2) make a related
point.
Nevertheless, the population who report a functional or ADL limi-
tation, but not a work limitation, is an interesting one to study, and one
that I examined in DeLeire (2001). These individuals do have health
impairments that limit them in some way, but they self-report that their
impairment does not limit the type or amount of work they can do.
They are reporting that they are just as productive as they would be if
they were not impaired, perhaps because they have already received a
successful job accommodation or their impairment is irrelevant for
their particular line of work.
Before extrapolating from the experiences under the ADA of this
subsample of people with disabilities to those of people with disabili-
ties as a whole, one should emphasize that the labor market experi-
ences of this group are not typical. Even before the enactment of the
ADA, people with functional or ADL limitations but no work limita-
tions earned just 4 percent less than nondisabled individuals, control-
ling for observable characteristics such as experience and education,
compared with almost 70 percent less for the remaining people with
disabilities (DeLeire 2001). 
 According to Kruse and Schur (2001), individuals with any func-
tional or ADL limitation but no work disability worked just 2.6 percent
fewer weeks than nondisabled individuals in 1990, and worked 3.1 per-
cent more weeks than nondisabled individuals in 1994. Although it is
interesting and important to document that a significant subpopulation
of people with disabilities earned just as much and worked just as
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much as people without disabilities even before the ADA was enacted,
these were not and are not the typical experiences of a person with a
disability. As has been documented in countless studies, including sev-
eral in this volume, the low employment rates and low earnings of peo-
ple with disabilities are problems that policymakers must address and
that the ADA was intended to address.
A possible explanation for why employment rates increase for
those who report a functional limitation and an ability to work is that
members of this group do not require additional accommodations
under the ADA. For example, DeLeire (2001) finds no wage gap for
this group, suggesting that individuals with functional limitations but
no work limitations require little in the way of accommodation. If so,
employers would have little reason to avoid hiring them under the
ADA. Alternatively, the ADA could be helping those workers with dis-
abilities who are already employed and who have already received
accommodation, and others with low accommodation costs, by provid-
ing them protection against unlawful terminations. However, the net
effect of the ADA for individuals who are seeking employment and
who require potentially expensive accommodations could be negative. 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
Economic studies have shown that antidiscrimination laws such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have reduced labor market discrimination,
promoted integration of protected classes (i.e., blacks) into the labor
force, and improved their labor earnings and economic well-being.
However, economic theory does not unambiguously predict such suc-
cess. Hence, the success of the Civil Rights Act does not assure that the
ADA has achieved similar goals for working-aged people with disabil-
ities.
This chapter argues that ADA’s antidiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation mandates have made workers with disabilities more
expensive for employers to hire. This has had the unintended conse-
quence of reducing their employment rate, rather than changing soci-
etal norms, reducing discrimination, and increasing their employment.
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To achieve the goals of more fully integrating working-aged peo-
ple into the labor force and reducing their dependence on disability-
based transfers, it is important to understand why the ADA failed
where the Civil Rights Act succeeded. More effort is needed in explor-
ing why the negative incentives of the ADA outweighed the positive
ones. One possibility is that, unlike the Civil Rights Act, the ADA
requires potentially expensive accommodations for workers with dis-
abilities. An exploration of the degree to which the costs of accommo-
dating workers with disabilities deters hiring should be undertaken.
As Houtenville and Daly show (Chapter 3), there is great variation
in the socioeconomic characteristics of working-aged people with dis-
abilities, and there has been significant variation in employment rate
experiences across subgroups during the 1990s. More work needs to be
done to explain why some workers with disabilities fared better than
others over this period, when the ADA was enforced. However, simply
ignoring the losses for the majority of individuals with disabilities and
focusing instead on the gains to the minority whose employment
improved, as several authors in this volume choose to do, is not appro-
priate, either methodologically or from a policy perspective, if the rea-
sons for the distinction between these classes relate to the policy under
review. Nonetheless, it is important to show that for some subpopula-
tions, employment improved during the 1990s. For example, my work
suggests that individuals whose disability onset occurred as a result of
a work-related injury did not suffer a reduction in their employment
during the 1990s (DeLeire 2000b). Kruse and Schur, as discussed
above, find that employment rates for some groups of people with dis-
abilities did not fall during the 1990s. A recent paper by Carpenter
(2002) finds that employment rates of individuals whose disability was
related to obesity (to whom ADA coverage was extended under Cook
v. Rhode Island in 1993) increased during this period. A more com-
plete understanding of the reasons behind this variation in outcomes
within the broader population with disabilities will help us design poli-
cies that better meet the ADA’s goal of integrating people with disabil-
ities into the labor force.
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Notes
 1. There are exceptions. Firms with 15 to 24 employees were not covered by the
ADA until 1994. Also, in a 1993 federal court case, Cook v. Rhode Island, the
ADA protected class was broadened to include workers with disabilities resulting
from obesity (see Carpenter 2002).
2. In an unpublished paper, DeLeire (1997) also used the panel study of income
dynamics to examine the impact of the ADA. Because the methods used and the
findings were similar to those in DeLeire (2000b) and Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), they are not reported here.
3. It is still a challenge to distinguish the effects of disability laws from time trends,
even with state variation in the timing of such laws. In an updated version of their
study, Beegle and Stock (forthcoming) demonstrate this difficulty; one does not
observe relative employment declines if one controls for disability specific time
effects across states. These time effects reflect pre-existing trends for the 13 states
which passed disability discrimination laws between 1980 and 1990, but may
either reflect these trends or may reflect continued declines in relative employ-
ment resulting from the presence of disability discrimination laws for the 33 states
that passed these laws between 1970 and 1980. In any case, the authors find
declines in the relative earnings of people with disabilities regardless of whether
these disability-specific time effects are controlled for.
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